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Abstract
We reformulate the Smets-Wouters (2007) framework by embed-
ding the theory of unemployment proposed in Galí (2011a,b). We
estimate the resulting model using postwar U.S. data, while treating
the unemployment rate as an additional observable variable. Our ap-
proach overcomes the lack of identiﬁcation of wage markup and labor
supply shocks highlighted by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2008) in
their criticism of New Keynesian models, and allows us to estimate a
"correct" measure of the output gap. In addition, the estimated model
can be used to analyze the sources of unemployment ﬂuctuations.
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1 Introduction
Over the past decade an increasing number of central banks and other pol-
icy institutions have developed and estimated medium-scale New Keynesian
DSGE models.1 The combination of a good empirical ﬁt with a sound, mi-
crofounded structure makes these models particularly suitable for forecasting
and policy analysis. However, as highlighted by Galí and Gerter (2009) and
others, one of the shortcomings of these models is the lack of a reference
to unemployment. This is unfortunate because unemployment is an impor-
tant indicator of aggregate resource utilization and the central focus of the
policy debate. Recently, a number of papers have started to address this
shortcoming by embedding in the basic New Keynesian model various the-
ories of unemployment based on the presence of labor market frictions (e.g.
Blanchard and Galí (2007), Christoﬀel et al (2007), Gertler, Sala and Tri-
gari (2008), Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2009), and de Walque et al
(2008)).
The present paper takes a diﬀerent approach. Following Gali (2011a,b),
it reformulates the Smets and Wouters (2007; henceforth, SW) model to
allow for involuntary unemployment, while preserving the convenience of
the representative household paradigm. Unemployment in the model results
from market power in labor markets, reﬂected in positive wage markups.
Variations in unemployment over time are associated with changes in wage
markups, either exogenous or resulting from nominal wage rigidities.2
1See, for example, Smets et al. (2010) for a short description of the two aggregate euro
area models used at the ECB. Two of the DSGE models used at the Federal Reserve are
described in Edge et al. (2007) and Erceg et al. (2006).
2The general approach builds on Galí (1996). See also Blanchard and Galí (2007),
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The proposed reformulation allows us to overcome an identiﬁcation prob-
lem pointed out by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2008; henceforth, CKM)
and interpreted by these authors as an illustration of the immaturity of New
Keynesian models for policy analysis. Their observation is motivated by the
SW ﬁnding that wage markup shocks account for almost 50 percent of the
variations in real GDP at horizons of more than 10 years. However, with-
out an explicit measure of unemployment (or, alternatively, labor supply),
these wage markup shocks cannot be distinguished from preference shocks
that shift the marginal disutility of labour. The policy implications of these
two sources of ﬂuctuations are, however, very diﬀerent. Variations in wage
markup shocks are ineﬃcient and a welfare-maximising government should
be interested in stabilising output ﬂuctuations resulting from those shocks
(at least partly). In contrast, output and employment ﬂuctuations driven
by preference shocks shifting the labor supply schedule, should in princi-
ple be accommodated. Put it diﬀerently, the relative importance of those
two shocks will inﬂuence the extent to which ﬂuctuations in output during
a given historical episode should or should not be interpreted as reﬂecting
movements in the welfare relevant output gap (i.e. the distance between the
actual and eﬃcient levels of output). By including unemployment as an ob-
servable variable, this identiﬁcation problem can be overcome, and "correct"
measures of the output gap can be constructed, as we show in Section 4.
When we estimate the reformulated SW model using unemployment as an
observable variable, we ﬁnd a much diminished role for wage markup shocks
Casares (2010), and Zanetti (2007) for related applications to the New Keynesian model.
After having circulated a ﬁrst draft of the present paper we became aware of Casares,
Moreno and Vázquez (2011), which contains an exercise close in spirit (but with substantial
diﬀerences in details) to the one presented here.
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as a source of output and employment ﬂuctuations, even though those shocks
preserve a large role as drivers of inﬂation. Our estimates lead us to classify
the multiple shocks in the model in three categories (which we label "de-
mand", "supply", and "labor market" shocks), on the basis of their implied
joint comovement among output, employment, the labor force, unemploy-
ment, inﬂation and the real wage, as captured by their associated impulse
response functions (IRFs). In addition, we show how the implied measure
of the welfare-relevant output gap is to a large extent the mirror image of
the unemployment rate, and resembles conventional measures of the cyclical
component of log GDP, based on statistical detrending methods (though the
correlation is far from perfect).
Our estimates of the reformulated SW model allow us to address a num-
ber of additional questions of interest which could not be dealt with using the
model’s original formulation. Thus, in section 5 we assess quantitatively the
relative importance of diﬀerent shocks as sources of unemployment ﬂuctua-
tions and their role during speciﬁc historical episodes, including the recent
recession. Also, our approach allows us to uncover a measure of the natural
rate of unemployment (i.e. the ﬂexible wage counterfactual) and to study
its comovement with actual unemployment. That comovement is shown to
be particularly strong at low frequencies, as expected, but the gap between
the two caused by wage rigidities is estimated to be large and persistent. We
also revisit the evidence on the joint behavior of inﬂation and unemployment
under the lens of our estimated model. This allows us to give a structural
interpretation to empirical Phillips curves, both for wage and price inﬂation.
In section 6 we discuss the robustness of our ﬁndings to the use of alternative
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sample period and data. Section 7 concludes.
In addition to reformulating the wage equation in terms of unemployment,
our model shows a number of small diﬀerences with that in SW (2007). First,
and regarding the data on which the estimation is based, we use employment
rather than hours worked, and redeﬁne the wage as the wage per worker
rather than the wage per hour. We do so since the model focuses on variations
in labor at the extensive margin, in a way consistent with the conventional
deﬁnition of unemployment. Given that most of the variation in hours worked
over the business cycle is due to changes in employment rather than hours
per employee, this change does not have major consequences in itself. We
also combine two alternative wage measures in the estimation, compensation
and earnings, and model their discrepancy explicitly. Second, we generalise
the utility function in a way that allows us to parameterize the strength of
the wealth eﬀect on labour supply, as shown in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009).
This generalisation yields a better ﬁt of the joint behavior of employment and
the labor force, as we discuss in detail. Third, for simplicity, we revert to
a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator rather than the Kimball aggrega t o ru s e di nS W
(2007).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
modiﬁed Smets-Wouters model. Next, Section 3 presents the data and es-
timation. Section 4 contains the discussion of the CKM critique. Section 5
analyses diﬀerent aspects of unemployment ﬂuctuations which the reformu-
lation of the SW model makes possible. Section 6 presents some robustness
exercises and, ﬁnally, Section 7 concludes.
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2 Introducing Unemployment in the Smets-
Wouters Model
2.1 Staggered Wage Setting and Wage Inﬂation Dy-
namics
This section introduces a variant of the wage setting block of the SW model,
which is in turn an extension of that in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000;
henceforth, EHL). The variant presented here, based on Galí (2011a,b), as-
sumes that labor is indivisible, with all variations in hired labor input taking
place at the extensive margin. That feature gives rise to a notion of unem-
ployment consistent with its empirical counterpart.
The model assumes a (large) representative household with a continuum
of members represented by the unit square and indexed by a pair (i,j) ∈
[0,1]×[0,1]. The ﬁrst dimension, indexed by i ∈ [0,1], represents the type of
labor service in which a given household member is specialized. The second
dimension, indexed by j ∈ [0,1], determines his disutility from work. The
latter is given by χtΘtjϕ if he is employed, zero otherwise, where χt > 0 is an
exogenous preference shifter (referred to below as a "labor supply shock"),
Θt is an endogenous preference shifter, taken as given by each individual
household and deﬁned below, and ϕ ≥ 0 is a parameter determining the
shape of the distribution of work disutilities across individuals.







log ￿ Ct(i,j) − 1t(i,j)χtΘtj
ϕ
￿
where ￿ Ct(i,j) ≡ Ct(i,j) − hCt−1, with h ∈ [0,1].and with Ct−1 denoting
(lagged) aggregate consumption (taken as given by each household), and
5 where 1t(i,j) is an indicator function taking a value equal to one if individ-
ual (i,j) is employed in period t, and zero otherwise. Thus, as in SW and
related monetary DSGE models, we allow for (external) habits in consump-
tion, indexed by h.
As in Merz (1995), full risk sharing of consumption among household
members is assumed, implying Ct(i,j)=Ct for all (i,j) ∈ [0,1]×[0,1] and t.

































where Nt(i) ∈ [0,1] denotes the employment rate in period t among workers
specialized in type i labor and ￿ Ct ≡ Ct − hCt−1.3 We deﬁne the endogenous




where Zt evolves over time according to the diﬀerence equation
Zt = Z
1−υ
t−1 (Ct − hCt−1)
υ
Thus Zt can be interpreted as a "smooth" trend for (quasi-diﬀerenced)
aggregate consumption. Our preference speciﬁcation implies a "consump-
tion externality" on individual labor supply: during aggregate consumption
3Alternatively, we can take the consumption utility of the household, log ￿ Ct, as a "prim-
itive," without making any assumption on how that consumption is distributed among
household members, possibly as a function of employment status.
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booms (i.e. when Ct −hCt−1 is above its trend value Zt), individual (as well
as household-level) marginal disutility from work goes down (at any given
level of employment).
The previous speciﬁcation generalizes the preferences assu m e di nS W
by allowing for an exogenous labor supply shock, χt, and by introducing
the endogenous shifter Θt, just described. The main role of the latter is to
reconcile the existence of a long-run balanced growth path with an arbitrarily
small short-term wealth eﬀect. The latter’s importance is determined by the
size of parameter υ ∈ [0,1]. As discussed below in detail, that feature is
needed in order to match the joint behavior of the labor force, consumption
and the wage over the business cycle. That modiﬁcation is related to, but
not identical, to the one proposed by Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) as a key
ingredient in order to account for the economy’s response to news about
future productivity increases.4
Note that under the previous preferences, the household-relevant marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and employment for type i workers








4In particular, and leaving aside the presence of habits, our speciﬁcation assumes that
the period utility is separable in consumption and employment, in contrast with that
in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009). This facilitates aggregation of individual utilities into
the household utility, and simpliﬁes the analysis by implying equalization of consumption
across individuals in the presence of risk sharing within each household.
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where the last equality is satisﬁed in a symmetric equilibrium with Ct = Ct.
Using lower case letters to denote the natural logarithms of the origi-
nal variables, we can derive the average (log) marginal rate of substitution
mrst ≡
￿ 1
0 mrst(i) di by integrating over all labor types:
mrst = zt + ϕnt + ξt
where nt ≡
￿ 1
0 nt(i) di is (log) aggregate employment and ξt ≡ logχt.
We assume nominal wages are set by "unions," each of which represents
the workers specialized in a given type of labor, and acting in an uncoor-
dinated way. As in EHL, and following the formalism of Calvo (1983), we
assume that the nominal wage for a labor service of a given type can only
be reset with probability 1 − θw each period. That probability is indepen-
dent of the time elapsed since the wage for that labor type was last reset,
in addition to being independent across labor types. Thus, and by the law
of large numbers, a fraction of workers θw do not reoptimize their wage in
any given period, making that parameter a natural index of nominal wage
rigidities. Furthermore, all those who reoptimize their wage choose an iden-
tical wage, denoted by W ∗
t , since they face an identical problem. Following
SW, we allow for partial wage indexation between re-optimization periods,
by making the nominal wage adjust mechanically in proportion to past price
inﬂation. Formally, and letting Wt+k|t denote the nominal wage in period
t + k for workers who last reoptimized their wage in period t, we assume







for k =1 ,2,3,...and Wt,t = W ∗
t , and where Π
p
t ≡ Pt/Pt−1 denotes the (gross)
rate of price inﬂation, Πp is its corresponding steady state value, Πx is the
8Introducing Unemployment in the Smets-Wouters Model
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the workers specialized in a given type of labor, and acting in an uncoor-
dinated way. As in EHL, and following the formalism of Calvo (1983), we
assume that the nominal wage for a labor service of a given type can only
be reset with probability 1 − θw each period. That probability is indepen-
dent of the time elapsed since the wage for that labor type was last reset,
in addition to being independent across labor types. Thus, and by the law
of large numbers, a fraction of workers θw do not reoptimize their wage in
any given period, making that parameter a natural index of nominal wage
rigidities. Furthermore, all those who reoptimize their wage choose an iden-
tical wage, denoted by W ∗
t , since they face an identical problem. Following
SW, we allow for partial wage indexation between re-optimization periods,
by making the nominal wage adjust mechanically in proportion to past price
inﬂation. Formally, and letting Wt+k|t denote the nominal wage in period
t + k for workers who last reoptimized their wage in period t, we assume







for k =1 ,2,3,...and Wt,t = W ∗
t , and where Π
p
t ≡ Pt/Pt−1 denotes the (gross)
rate of price inﬂation, Πp is its corresponding steady state value, Πx is the
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steady state (gross) growth rate of productivity, and γw ∈ [0,1] measures the
degree of wage indexation to past inﬂation.
When reoptimizing their wage in period t, workers (or the union represent-
ing them) choose a wage W ∗
t in order to maximize their respective households
utility (as opposed to their individual utility), subject to the usual sequence
of household ﬂow budget constraints, as well as a sequence of isoelastic de-
mand schedules of the form Nt+k|t =( Wt+k|t/Wt+k)−ǫw,tNt+k, where Nt+k|t
denotes period t+k employment among workers whose wage was last reopti-
mized in period t, and where ǫw,t is the period t wage elasticity of the relevant
labor demand schedule.5 We assume that elasticity varies exogenously over
time, thus leading to changes in workers’ market power.
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ϕ
t+k|t is the relevant
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and employment in pe-
riod t + k, and Mn
w,t ≡
ǫw,t
ǫw,t−1 is the natural (or desired) wage markup in
period t, i.e. the one that would obtain under ﬂexible wages.




















Log-linearizing (1) and (2) around a perfect foresight steady state and
combining the resulting expressions, allows us to derive (after some algebra)
5Details of the derivation of the optimal wage setting condition can be found in EHL
(2000).
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the following equation for wage inﬂation πw
t ≡ wt − wt−1 :
π
w














the (log) natural wage markup, and
µw,t ≡ (wt − pt) − mrst (4)
is the (log) average wage markup, i.e. the log deviation between the average
real wage and the average marginal rate of substitution. As equation (3)
makes clear, variations in wage inﬂation above and beyond those resulting
from indexation to past price inﬂation are driven by deviations of average
wage markup from its natural level, because those deviations generate pres-
sure on workers currently setting wages to adjust those wages in one direction
or another.
One might argue that the previous model provides, if interpreted liter-
ally, an unrealistic description of wage setting in the U.S. We view it instead
as a simple modelling device, consistent with the labor market block of the
medium-scale DSGE models currently used for policy analysis (as exempliﬁed
by the SW model), and embedding three features of actual labor markets:
(i) nominal wage rigidities, (ii) staggered wage-setting, and (iii) the presence
of average wage levels above their perfectly competitive counterparts, result-
ing from diﬀerent sources of market power by workers which prevent their
underbidding by the unemployed.
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2.2 Introducing Unemployment
Consider an individual specialized in type i labor and with disutility of work
χtΘtjϕ. Using household welfare as a criterion, and taking as given current
labor market conditions (as summarized by the prevailing wage for his labor
type), that individual will ﬁnd it optimal to participate in the labor market










Evaluating the previous condition at the symmetric equilibrium, and let-





Taking logs and integrating over i we obtain
wt − pt = zt + ϕlt + ξt (5)
where lt ≡
￿ 1
0 lt(i) di can be interpreted as the (log) aggregate participation
or labor force.
Following Galí (2011a,b), we deﬁne the unemployment rate ut as:
ut ≡ lt − nt (6)
Note that under our assumptions, the unemployed thus deﬁned include
all the individuals who would like to be working (given current labor market
conditions, and while internalizing the beneﬁts that this will bring to their
households) but are not currently employed. It is in that sense that one can
11Introducing Unemployment in the Smets-Wouters Model
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view unemployment as involuntary.6
Combining (4) with (5) and (6), the following simple linear relation be-
tween the average wage markup and the unemployment rate can be derived
µw,t = ϕut (7)
which is also graphically illustrated in Figure 1.
Finally, combining (3) and (7) we obtain an equation relating wage inﬂa-
tion to price inﬂation, the unemployment rate and the wage markup.
π
w









Note that in contrast with the representation of the wage equation found
in SW and related papers, the error term in (8) captures exclusively shocks
to the wage markup, and not preference shocks (even though the latter have
been allowed for in our model). That feature, made possible by reformulating
the wage equation in terms of the (observable) unemployment rate, allows
us to overcome the identiﬁcation problem raised by CKM in their critique of
New Keynesian models. We turn to this issue below, when we discuss our
empirical ﬁndings.
Finally, note that we can deﬁne the natural rate of unemployment, un
t , as
the unemployment rate that would prevail in the absence of nominal wage
rigidities. Under our assumptions, that natural rate will vary exogenously
6As noted by one of our discussants, unemployed individuals will enjoy a higher utility
ex-post, since their consumption will be the same but won’t experience any disutility from
work. This is, of course, an unavoidable consequence of our assumption of full consumption
risk-sharing within the household. Under the latter assumption, and given the inﬁnitesimal
weight of each individual in the household, not internalizing the beneﬁts to the latter of
an individual’s employment would unavoidably lead to no participation.
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The remaining equations describing the log-linearized equilibrium condi-
tions of the model are presented in the appendix. Those equations are iden-
tical to a particular case of the speciﬁcation in SW (2007), corresponding
to logarithmic consumption utility. In addition to the wage markup and la-
bor supply shocks discussed above, the model includes six additional shocks:
a neutral, factor-augmenting productivity shock, a price markup shock; a
risk premium shock, an exogenous spending shock, an investment-speciﬁc
technology shock and a monetary policy shock.
3 Data and Estimation
3.1 Data
We estimate our model on US data for the sample period 1966Q1-2007Q4 us-
ing Bayesian full-system estimation techniques as in SW (2007). We end our
estimation period in 2007Q4 to prevent our estimates from being distorted
by the non-linearities induced by the zero lower bound on the federal funds
rate and binding downward nominal wage rigidities during the most recent
recession.7 In Section 5 below we nevertheless use the estimated model to
interpret the behaviour of unemployment in the recent recession, i.e. beyond
7For some discussion on how downward nominal wage rigidity may distort the the
estimates of the New Keynesian wage Phillips curve, see Gali (2011a).
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the estimated period. Section 7 on robustness discusses brieﬂy the impact of
estimating our model over an extended sample period ending in 2010Q4.
Five of the seven data series used by SW (2007) are also used here: GDP,
consumption, investment, GDP deﬂator inﬂation, and the federal funds rate,
with the ﬁrst three expressed in per capita terms and log diﬀerenced. As
the SW model is reformulated in terms of employment (given our interest in
explaining unemployment), we use per capita employment rather than hours
worked. The main results are not aﬀected if we use hours instead, as discussed
in Section 7. In addition, we experiment with two wage concepts. The ﬁrst
one is total compensation per employee obtained from the BLS Productivity
and Costs Statistics.8 The second one is "average weekly earnings" from the
Current Employment Statistics. Finally, we add the unemployment rate as
an additional observable variable. In the following section, we systematically
compare the model estimated with and without the latter variable as an
observable variable.
The properties of both wage series are quite diﬀerent.9 This is illustrated
in Figure 2, which plots their quarterly nominal growth rates. First, average
wage inﬂation based on compensation per employee is signiﬁcantly higher
than that based on earnings per employee (1.24 versus 1.02). Given average
price inﬂation, the compensation series appears more compatible with a bal-
anced growth path in which real wages grow at the same rate as real output,
consumption and investment. Second, the compensation series is much more
volatile than the earnings series, especially over the past two decades. The
8Note that SW (2007) used compensation per hour instead, in a way consistent with
their model speciﬁcation.
9See Abraham, Spletzer and Stewart (1999) and Mehran and Tracy (2001) for a dis-
cussion about the sources of some of those diﬀerence.
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standard deviation of wage inﬂation based on compensation is 0.70, com-
pared to 0.56 for the earnings-based series. Finally, the correlation between
both wage inﬂation measures is surprisingly low at 0.60.
For our baseline estimation, we use both wage series as imperfect measures
of the model-based wage concept. This is done by adding measurement error
to the corresponding measurement equations and allowing for a separate,
smaller trend in the earnings series.10 In the section on robustness, we brieﬂy
discuss the estimation results when we only use the compensation series. In
the rest of the paper, we focus on the model with both wage concepts and
measurement error.
3.2 Estimation Results
Table 1 compares the estimated structural parameters of the model obtained
with and without unemployment being used as an observable variable. As
discussed above, adding unemployment allows us to separately identify wage
markup and labour supply shocks. In addition, it allows us to exploit the
model’s prediction of proportionality between the unemployment rate and
the wage markup (see equation (7)), in order to identify and estimate the
elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent labor types, which in turn deter-
mines the steady-state wage markup. In the model without unemployment
this parameter is not identiﬁed; instead, we calibrate it to be very similar to
the mean of the estimate in the model with observable unemployment.
Overall, most of the estimated structural parameters are very similar in
10A similar strategy is followed by Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2011). They
show how using a single series (compensation) and not allowing for measurement error
implies a standard deviations for the estimated wage markup shocks that is six times
higher than in their baseline model.
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the two models.11 Focusing on the parameters that are important for the
labour market, a number of ﬁndings are worth emphasizing.12 First, the
estimated labour supply elasticity is quite similar whether one uses unem-
ployment or not as an observable variable: the inverse of the Frisch elasticity
increases slightly from 3.3 to 4.0 as one includes unemployment. In the latter
case, the steady state wage markup is identiﬁed and estimated to be slightly
below 20 percent, which is consistent with an average unemployment rate of
about 5 percent.
Turning to some of the other parameters that enter the wage Phillips
curve, the estimated degree of wage indexation is relatively small (around
0.15) and robust across the two models. The estimated Calvo probability
of unchanged wages falls somewhat from 0.61 to 0.47, suggesting relatively
ﬂexible wages with average contract durations of 2 quarters. Overall, the
introduction of unemployment as an observable variable leads to a somewhat
steeper wage Phillips curve.
Third, the parameter, ν, governing the short-run wealth eﬀects on labour
supply, changes quite dramatically from 0.73 to 0.02. Roughly speaking this
amounts to a change from preferences close to those in King, Plosser and
Rebelo (1988; henceforth, KPR), characterized by strong short-run wealth
eﬀects on labor supply, to a speciﬁcation closer to that in Greenwood, Her-
cowitz and Huﬀman (1988). In the latter case, wealth eﬀects are close to
11A robust feature of the model with observed unemployment is that the labour pref-
erence shock and the productivity shock are positively correlated. Allowing for such a
correlation further improves the ﬁt of the model, but does not aﬀect the estimation results
discussed below.
12Unless otherwise noted, we will consistently refer to the mode of the posterior proba-
bility distribution when discussing estimates. Table 1 also reports the mean and 5 and 95
percentiles of the posterior distribution.
16
the two models.11 Focusing on the parameters that are important for the
labour market, a number of ﬁndings are worth emphasizing.12 First, the
estimated labour supply elasticity is quite similar whether one uses unem-
ployment or not as an observable variable: the inverse of the Frisch elasticity
increases slightly from 3.3 to 4.0 as one includes unemployment. In the latter
case, the steady state wage markup is identiﬁed and estimated to be slightly
below 20 percent, which is consistent with an average unemployment rate of
about 5 percent.
Turning to some of the other parameters that enter the wage Phillips
curve, the estimated degree of wage indexation is relatively small (around
0.15) and robust across the two models. The estimated Calvo probability
of unchanged wages falls somewhat from 0.61 to 0.47, suggesting relatively
ﬂexible wages with average contract durations of 2 quarters. Overall, the
introduction of unemployment as an observable variable leads to a somewhat
steeper wage Phillips curve.
Third, the parameter, ν, governing the short-run wealth eﬀects on labour
supply, changes quite dramatically from 0.73 to 0.02. Roughly speaking this
amounts to a change from preferences close to those in King, Plosser and
Rebelo (1988; henceforth, KPR), characterized by strong short-run wealth
eﬀects on labor supply, to a speciﬁcation closer to that in Greenwood, Her-
cowitz and Huﬀman (1988). In the latter case, wealth eﬀects are close to
11A robust feature of the model with observed unemployment is that the labour pref-
erence shock and the productivity shock are positively correlated. Allowing for such a
correlation further improves the ﬁt of the model, but does not aﬀect the estimation results
discussed below.
12Unless otherwise noted, we will consistently refer to the mode of the posterior proba-
bility distribution when discussing estimates. Table 1 also reports the mean and 5 and 95
percentiles of the posterior distribution.
16
zero in the short run. As discussed below, this helps ensure that not only
employment, but also the labour force moves procyclically in response to
most shocks.13
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the monetary policy reaction coef-
ﬁcient to the output gap (deﬁned as the deviation relative to the constant
markup output), doubles from 0.07 to 0.15. As discussed below, this is mainly
due to the lower volatility of the output gap once unemployment is used to
identify wage markup shocks.
3.3 Impulse Responses
Figures 3 to 5 show the estimated impulse responses of output, inﬂation, the
real wage, the interest rate, employment, the labour force, the unemployment
rate, and the output gap to the eight structural shocks. Figure 3 focuses on
the four "demand" shocks, which include the investment-speciﬁc technology
shock, the risk premium shock, the exogenous spending shock and the mone-
tary policy shock. We use the label "demand" to refer to those shocks because
they all imply a positive comovement beween output, inﬂation and the real
wage. It is particularly noteworthy that employment and the labour force
comove positively in response to all those shocks. Note, however, that the
size of the labour force response is typically much smaller than that of em-
ployment, so that unemployment ﬂuctuations are mostly driven by changes
in employment. This is consistent with the unconditional second moments of
detrended data (see, e.g., Galí (2011c), as well as the empirical VAR evidence
13Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) have argued that small short-run wealth eﬀects on labour
supply are necessary to generate a positive response of output to favorable news about
future productivity.
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ployment, so that unemployment ﬂuctuations are mostly driven by changes
in employment. This is consistent with the unconditional second moments of
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on the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks as shown in Christiano et al. (2010).
Figure 4 reports the dynamic responses to the labour supply and markup
shocks, which we group under the heading of "labor market" shocks. These
shocks generate a negative comovement of inﬂation and the real wage with
output. An adverse wage markup shock has a sizeable positive impact on
price inﬂation and unemployment and a negative one on output, employment
and the output gap, thus generating a clear trade-oﬀ for policy makers. On
the other hand, an adverse labor supply shock has similar negative eﬀects on
output, employment and the output gap (and positive eﬀects on inﬂation),
but instead leads to a rise in the output gap and a drop in the unemployment
rate, so that no signiﬁcant policy trade-oﬀ arises. It is this diﬀerent eﬀect on
unemployment and the output gap associated with the two labour market
shocks that makes their separate identiﬁcation so important from a policy
perspective, as further discussed below.
Figure 5 displays the estimated model’s implied impulse responses to
a positive neutral technology shock and a (negative) price markup shock.
We refer to those shocks as "supply" shocks, their distinctive feature being
that they generate simultaneously a procyclical real wage response and a
countercyclical response of inﬂation. It is worth noting, that, in line with
much of the empirical evidence (e.g. Galí (1999), Barnichon (2010)), in our
estimated model a positive technology shock leads to a short-run decline
in employment and a rise in the unemployment rate. This is in contrast
with the predictions of conventially calibrated real business cycle or search
and matching models. Secondly, and in a way analogous to wage markup
shocks, we see that price markup shocks also create a policy trade-oﬀ between
18Data and Estimation
National Bank of Poland 20
3
on the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks as shown in Christiano et al. (2010).
Figure 4 reports the dynamic responses to the labour supply and markup
shocks, which we group under the heading of "labor market" shocks. These
shocks generate a negative comovement of inﬂation and the real wage with
output. An adverse wage markup shock has a sizeable positive impact on
price inﬂation and unemployment and a negative one on output, employment
and the output gap, thus generating a clear trade-oﬀ for policy makers. On
the other hand, an adverse labor supply shock has similar negative eﬀects on
output, employment and the output gap (and positive eﬀects on inﬂation),
but instead leads to a rise in the output gap and a drop in the unemployment
rate, so that no signiﬁcant policy trade-oﬀ arises. It is this diﬀerent eﬀect on
unemployment and the output gap associated with the two labour market
shocks that makes their separate identiﬁcation so important from a policy
perspective, as further discussed below.
Figure 5 displays the estimated model’s implied impulse responses to
a positive neutral technology shock and a (negative) price markup shock.
We refer to those shocks as "supply" shocks, their distinctive feature being
that they generate simultaneously a procyclical real wage response and a
countercyclical response of inﬂation. It is worth noting, that, in line with
much of the empirical evidence (e.g. Galí (1999), Barnichon (2010)), in our
estimated model a positive technology shock leads to a short-run decline
in employment and a rise in the unemployment rate. This is in contrast
with the predictions of conventially calibrated real business cycle or search
and matching models. Secondly, and in a way analogous to wage markup
shocks, we see that price markup shocks also create a policy trade-oﬀ between
18
stabilizing inﬂation and the output gap. This is not the case for technology
shocks, since they drive both these variables in the same direction.
Before turning to several interesting questions that can be addressed with
our estimated model, we wish to emphasize the importance of departing from
conventional KPR preferences in order to match certain aspects of the data.
Note that under standard KPR preferences (υ =1 ) the labor supply equation
(5) can be written as
wt − pt = ct + ϕlt + ξt
where habit formation is omitted to simplify the argument. As emphasized by
Christiano et al. (2010) the previous equation is at odds with their empirical
estimates of the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks, which show a counter-
cyclical response of wt − pt − ct coexisting with a procyclical response of
the labor force lt. Instead, under the assumed preferences, a procyclical re-
sponse of the labor force is consistent with the model as long as the short
run wealth eﬀect is suﬃciently weak, implying a small adjustment of zt and
hence a procyclical response of wt − pt − zt . This is illustrated in Figure 6
which compares the impulse responses of employment, the labor force and
the unemployment rate to a monetary policy shock under (i) our baseline
estimated model and (ii) an otherwise identical model with KPR preferences
(corresponding to ν =1 ). Note that in the latter case, and in contrast with
the evidence, the labor force indeed falls signiﬁcantly following an easing
of monetary policy, amplifying the response of the unemployment rate and
becoming as important a driver of the latter as employment.
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4 Wage Markup vs. Labour Supply Shocks:
Addressing the CKM Critique
In this section we address one of the CKM criticisms pointing to an im-
plausibly large variance of wage markups shocks and a large contribution
of the latter to output and employment ﬂuctuations, often implied by esti-
mated DSGE models (e.g. SW (2007)). As argued by CKM, that evidence
cannot be of much use to policymakers since the SW model is not able to
distinguish between wage markup and labor supply shocks. They are eﬀec-
tively "lumped together" as a residual in the wage equation, even though—as
discussed above—they have very diﬀerent policy implications.
As discussed above, that problem of incomplete identiﬁcation is over-
come by our reformulation of the SW model using the unemployment rate
as an observable variable.14 In particular, the estimated parameters of the
ARMA(1,1) process for the exogenous wage markup reported in Table 1
imply the latter’s standard deviation drops from 23 to 12 percent once un-
employment is included as an observable. Based on equation (7) and the
estimated inverse labour supply elasticity, this implies a standard deviation
of the natural unemployment rate of the order of 3%. This estimate is rela-
tively high, but not unreasonable, especially given that much of that volatility
is concentrated at low frequencies, unrelated to business cycles.
How important are wage markup shocks in driving output and employ-
14Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010) seek to overcome that problem by as-
suming a diﬀerent stochastic structure for both driving forces: purely transitory in the
case of markup shocks, and potentially persistent (as allowed for by an AR(1) process) for
the labor supply shock. Their assumption of a white noise wage markup shock is at odds
with our estimated process for that shock, which displays an important low frequency
component.
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ment ﬂuctuations in our estimated model? Table 2 presents the variance
decomposition of the forecast errors of the eight observable variables at the
10 quarter and 10 year horizons. The ﬁrst entry in each cell gives the percent
contribution of each shock to ﬂuctuations in each variable in the model with
unemployment as an observable, whereas the second entry given the corre-
sponding share in the model without unemployment. CKM argue that the
contribution of the wage markup shocks to output and employment ﬂuctua-
tions (about 50 and 80 percent at the 10 year horizon in the model without
unemployment) was too high to be plausible. Distinguishing labour supply
shocks from wage markup shocks by introducing unemployment helps ad-
dress this issue. From Table 2 it is clear that the contribution of the wage
markup shocks to output (employment) ﬂuctuations at the 10 year horizon
drops substantially, from 45 (77) percent to 17 (39) percent, in the model
with unemployment. Furthermore, in the latter labor supply shocks (which
are now separately identiﬁed) account for about 17, 40 and 89 percent of
ﬂuctuations in output, employment and the labor force respectively (instead
they are ignored in the model without unemployment, as in SW (2007)).
As discussed by CKM, the identiﬁcation of wage markup and labor sup-
ply shocks has implications for monetary policy, since those two shocks have
very diﬀerent eﬀects on the eﬃcient level of output and thus on the welfare-
relevant output gap. Figure 7 plots the output gap, deﬁned as the log devi-
ation between actual output and the level of output that would prevail with
constant mark-ups and ﬂexible prices and wages. Two versions of the same
variable are shown, as implied by the estimated models with and without un-
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employment, respectively.15 Figure 7 shows that the separate identiﬁcation
of labor supply shocks allowed by our reformulation has a substantial impact
on the estimated output gap, which now looks considerably more stationary.
How does our estimated output gap relate to other variables often used as
cyclical indicators? Figure 8 shows that our estimate of the output gap is to
a large extent the mirror image of the unemployment rate. The correlation
between the two is −0.95. This ﬁnding suggests that variations in wage
markups, whether exogenous or induced by wage rigidities, are a key factor
underlying ineﬃcient output ﬂuctuations.16 That ﬁnding is consistent with
the evidence in Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2007).17
Finally, Figure 9 emphasizes that the model-based output gap resem-
bles conventional measures of the cyclical component of log GDP, based on
a variety of statistical detrending methods (HP ﬁlter, band-pass ﬁlter and
quadratic detrending, as well as the CBO measure).18 There are, however,
periods such as the 2005-2006 boom period with substantial deviations from
the conventional measures. The output gap correlation with each of the four
measures lies in the 0.6 − 0.8 range, with quadratic detrending showing the
15Note that, under the assumptions of the model, the output gap thus deﬁned will diﬀer
from the gap relative the eﬃcient level of output by an additive constant.
16See also the analysis in Galí (2011b) in the context of a much simpler model. A
similar qualitative ﬁnding is uncovered in Sala, Soderstrom, and Trigari (2010), though
their approach is subject to the CKM critique.
17It would also appear to be consistent with the evidence on the so-called "labor wedge"
(e.g. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007), Shimer (2010)). Note, however, that the
concept of "labor wedge" often used in the literature refers to the gap between the marginal
rate of substitution and the marginal product of labor (as opposed to the wage). As a
result (and despite its name) it captures variations in goods makets distortions, like price
markups, in addition to labor market ones.
18Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2011) obtain a qualitatively similar ﬁnding,
using an approach that does not exploit the connection between unemployment and wage
markups, assuming instead a particular stochastic structure for the latter (white noise).
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highest value.
5 Understanding Unemployment Fluctuations
In the present section we use our estimated model to analyze diﬀerent aspects
of unemployment ﬂuctuations, which the reformulation of the SW model
makes possible.
First, we can assess the role of wage rigidities as a factor underlying ob-
served unemployment ﬂuctuations by comparing the observed unemployment
rate to its estimated natural counterpart, where the latter is deﬁned as the
unemployment rate that would be observed in the absence of nominal wage
rigidities, as determined by equation (9). Figure 10 shows the time series
for both variables, together with the gap between the two. The ﬁgure makes
clear that the natural rate of unemployment accounts for a large fraction of
the low-frequency movements in the observed unemployment rate. Yet, it
is clear that the natural rate cannot account for the bulk of unemployment
ﬂuctuations at business cycle frequencies, which are captured by the unem-
ployment gap. Those ﬂuctuations should thus be attributed to the presence
of wage rigidities, interacting with the diﬀerent shocks.
The variance decomposition reported in Table 1 shows that about 50
percent of unemployment ﬂuctuations at the 10-quarter horizon is due to
"demand " shocks, with a prominent role attributed to risk premium shocks.
The other half is mostly due to wage mark-up shocks. In the longer run (10-
year horizon), the contribution of demand shocks drops to 17 percent and
wage markup shocks become the dominant driving force. Interestingly, those
wage markup shocks also explain a dominant share of the ﬂuctuations in
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result (and despite its name) it captures variations in goods makets distortions, like price
markups, in addition to labor market ones.
18Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2011) obtain a qualitatively similar ﬁnding,
using an approach that does not exploit the connection between unemployment and wage
markups, assuming instead a particular stochastic structure for the latter (white noise).
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of wage rigidities, interacting with the diﬀerent shocks.
The variance decomposition reported in Table 1 shows that about 50
percent of unemployment ﬂuctuations at the 10-quarter horizon is due to
"demand " shocks, with a prominent role attributed to risk premium shocks.
The other half is mostly due to wage mark-up shocks. In the longer run (10-
year horizon), the contribution of demand shocks drops to 17 percent and
wage markup shocks become the dominant driving force. Interestingly, those
wage markup shocks also explain a dominant share of the ﬂuctuations in
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price and wage inﬂation at all horizons. In contrast, labor supply and other
supply shocks have only a limited impact on unemployment. The labor force
instead is mostly driven by labor supply shocks, with most other shocks
having a very limited impact on that variable.
The importance of demand and wage markup shocks in driving unem-
ployment can also be illustrated by means of the historical decomposition
depicted in Figure 11. The secular rise of unemployment and inﬂation in
the 1970s and early 1980s is mostly driven by cost-push factors coming from
increasing wage markups. This is reversed in the mid 1980s. On the other
hand, most of the unemployment ﬂuctuations at business cycle frequencies
are seen to be driven by demand shocks. This is particularly the case since the
early 1990s. Both the 2001 and 2007-2008 recessions are driven by negative
demand shocks. Figure 12 zooms in on the most recent recession, displaying
the contribution of each individual shock to the rise of unemployment over
this period. We see that about three quarters of the 5 percentage point in-
crease in the unemployment rate is due to demand factors, with adverse risk
premium shocks playing a large role at the start of the crisis, thus capturing
the tightening of ﬁnancial conditions. As of 2009 our estimates identify an
"eﬀective" tightening of monetary policy, which we attribute to the attain-
ment of the zero lower bound on the federal funds rate, and which is shown
to contribute about 1 to 2 percentage points to the rise in the unemployment
rate. Finally, it is also worth noting that our estimates suggest a signiﬁcant
contribution of wage markup shocks to the recent rise in the unemployment
rate. As conjectured by Gali (2011a), this may be due to downward nominal
wage rigidities interacting with very low inﬂation, which may have prevented
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the average real wage from adjusting as much as it would be warranted by
the decline in inﬂation and the rise in unemployment.
Finally, we can use the estimated model to interpret the observed co-
movements between the unemployment rate and measures of wage and price
inﬂation. With that objective, Figure 13 displays the joint variation in wage
inﬂation and the unemployment rate conditional on each shock, as well as
their unconditional joint variation (bottom-right diagram). The evidence
makes clear that whatever Phillips-curve-like negative comovement between
wage inﬂation and unemployment can be found in the data it is largely the
result of the four demand shocks. By contrast, wage markup shocks generate
what looks like a positive lower frequency comovement in both variables, and
are largely reponsible for the lack of a clean Phillips-curve-like pattern in the
observed data. Supply shocks, on the other hand, lead to a near-zero co-
movement. Note that this is still consistent with wage inﬂation equation (3)
(given the forward-looking nature of the latter), for their implied responses
of unemployment display a sign switch (see Figure 5), thus leaving wage
inﬂation largely unchanged as a result.
Figure 14 displays analogous evidence for unemployment and price inﬂa-
tion. As in the case of wage inﬂation, the four demand shocks generate a
clear negative comovement between price inﬂation and the unemployment
rate, while wage markup shocks underlie a low frequency positive comove-
ment. Contrary to traditional textbook analyses, productivity shocks are
also shown to generate a negative comovement between price inﬂation and
the unemployment rate. On the other hand, price markup shocks produce a
nearly vertical Phillips curve, since their impact on the unemployment rate
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is tiny, while their eﬀect on price inﬂation is substantial.
6 Robustness
In this section we brieﬂy summarize the ﬁndings based on a number of alter-
native speciﬁcations. First, we use hours worked rather than employment as
our measure of labour input. While the benchmark model is written in terms
of employment, the actual labour input that enters the production function
should be total hours worked. Using employment will therefore distort the
estimated productivity process. When we use hours, we leave the unemploy-
ment rate unchanged, thus making the implicit assumption that those who
are unemployed want to work the same number of hours as those who are em-
ployed.19 In that alternative speciﬁcation we also use wage per hour. When
we leave the model unchanged but use hours worked rather than employ-
ment as our measure of labour input, the main results emphasized above are
not aﬀected. The full set of results is available on request. Two diﬀerences
are worth mentioning. First, as expected, the contribution of productivity
shocks to output ﬂuctuations becomes less important. Second, the degree
of wage rigidity is estimated to be higher (0.60) and as a result the slope of
the Phillips curve becomes less steep, due to the greater cyclical volatility of
wage per worker relative to wage per hour.
Second, we also estimate the model using only the compensation series as
a wage measure. Again, the main results are unchanged. The main impact of
the higher volatility in the compensation series is to increase the estimate of
19In order to address these issues, ideally we need to explicitly include the intensive
margin, i.e. hours worked per employee, in the model and re-estimate it accordingly.
That extension is part of our currently ongoing research.
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the inverse Frisch elasticity of the labour supply to 5.6 when unemployment
is added. With higher observed volatility of wages, the response of labour
supply to real wages is estimated to be less. This has an additional impact
on some of the other parameters, such as the degree of habit formation.
Thirdly, we have also estimated the model under KPR preferences (i.e.,
imposing υ =0 ) and an alternative set of Jaimovich-Rebelo preferences where
the Zt factor evolves in line with aggregate productivity instead of aggregate
consumption. The model with KPR preferences leads to a signiﬁcant dete-
rioration of the empirical ﬁt by about 15 points. As discussed above, in this
case the labor force moves countercyclically in response to monetary policy
and other demand shocks. However, the modiﬁed JR model leads to a signiﬁ-
cantly improved empirical ﬁt by about 28 points. Moreover, the parameter υ
rises back to 0.9 (from 0.02 in the baseline model) suggesting that in response
to productivity shocks the data prefer stronger short-run wealth eﬀects on
labor supply. We still need to think harder about the interpretation of these
results.
Finally, we have also re-estimated our model using data up to 2010Q4,
thus ignoring the potential problems raised earlier (likely mis-speciﬁcation
of the interest rate rule and the wage equation due to nonlinearities at work
during this period). The main diﬀerence with the benchmark results is that
the estimated wage stickiness rises and the overall persistence in the economy
as captured by the persistence of the shocks also goes up.
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7
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a reformulated version of the Smets-Wouters
(2007) framework that embeds the theory of unemployment proposed in Galí
(2011a,b). We estimate the resulting model using postwar U.S. data, while
treating the unemployment rate as an additional observable variable. This
helps overcome the lack of identiﬁcation of wage markup and labor supply
shocks highlighted by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2008) in their criticism
of New Keynesian models. In turn, our approach allows us to estimate a
"correct" measure of the output gap. In addition, the estimated model can
be used to analyze the sources of unemployment ﬂuctuations.
A number of key results emerge from our analysis. First, we show that
wage markup shocks play a smaller role in driving output and employment
ﬂuctuations than previously thought. Secondly, ﬂuctuations in our estimated
output gap are shown to be the near mirror image of those experienced by the
unemployment rate, and to be well approximated by conventional measures
of the cyclical component of GDP. Thirdly, demand shocks are the main
driver of unemployment ﬂuctuations at business cycle frequencies, but wage
markup shocks are shown to be more important at lower frequencies. Finally,
our estimates point to an adverse risk-premium shock as the key force behind
the initial rise in unemployment during the Great Recession. The important
role uncovered for monetary policy and wage markup shocks at a later stage
may be interpreted as capturing the likely eﬀects of the zero lower bound on
the nominal rate and of downward wage rigidities (as opposed to those of
truly exogenous shocks).
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APPENDIX
In this appendix, we summarize the remaining log-linear equations of the
estimated model. For a more detailed presentation, we refer to the discussion
in SW.
• Consumption Euler equation:
￿ ct = c1￿ ct−1 + (1 − c1)Et{￿ ct+1}−c2(￿ rt − Et{￿ πt+1} +￿ ε
b
t)
with c1 ≡ (h/τ)/(1+h/τ),c 2 ≡ (1−h/τ)/(1+h/τ) where h is the external
habit parameter and τ ≡ Πx is the trend growth rate. ￿ rt is the nominal
interest rate and ￿ ε
b
t is the exogenous AR(1) risk premium process.
• Investment Euler equation:
￿ it = i1￿ it−1 + (1 − i1)Et{￿ it+1} + i2￿ qt +￿ ε
q
t
with i1 =1 /(1+β),i 2 = i1/(τ2Ψ) where β is the household’s discount factor,
and Ψ is the elasticity of the capital adjustment cost function. ￿ qt is the value
of installed capital and ￿ ε
q
t is the exogenous AR(1) process for the investment
speciﬁc technology.
• Value of the capital stock:




t+1} + (1 − q1)Et{￿ qt+1}
with q1 = rk/(rk + (1 − δ)) where ￿ rk
t is the capital rental rate and δ the
depreciation rate.
• Goods market clearing
￿ yt = cy￿ ct + iy￿ it +￿ ε
g
t + vy￿ vt
= Mp(α￿ kt + (1 − α)￿ nt +￿ ε
a
t)
29 with cy ≡ (C/Y), iy ≡ (I/Y), and vy ≡ RkK/Y. Parameter Mp denotes the
degree of returns to scale which is assumed to correspond to the price markup
in steady state. ￿ ε
g
t and ￿ ε
a
t are the AR(1) processes representing respectiely
exogenous demand components and the neutral-technology process.
• Price-setting under the Calvo model with indexation:
￿ π
p










− π2(￿ µp,t − ￿ µ
n
p,t)
with π1 = (1−βθp)(1−θp)/[θp(1+(Mp−1)ςp)], where θp and γp respectively
denote the Calvo price stickiness and the price indexation parameters, ςp is
the curvature of the Kimball aggregator.
• Average and natural price markups







p,t = 100 ∗￿ ε
p
t
where ωt ≡ wt − pt is the real wage
• Wage-setting under the Calvo model with indexation:
￿ π
w
t − γw￿ π
p




t) − λw(￿ µw,t − ￿ µ
n
w,t)
with λw ≡ (1 − βθw)(1 − θw)/[θw(1 + ǫwϕ)].
• Average and natural wage markups and unemployment
￿ µw,t = ￿ ωt − (￿ zt +￿ ε
χ
t + ϕ￿ nt)
= ϕ￿ ut
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￿ zt = (1 − υ)￿ zt−1 + υ[(1/(1 − h/γ))￿ ct − ((h/γ)/(1 − h/γ))￿ ct−1]
where the exogenous labor supply shock ￿ ε
χ
t is assumed to follow a highly
persistent AR(1) process with autoregressive coeﬃcient ﬁxed at ρχ =0 .999.
• Labor force:
￿ lt = ￿ nt + ￿ ut
• Capital accumulation equation:
￿ ¯ kt = κ1￿ ¯ kt−1 + (1 − κ1)￿ it + κ2￿ ε
q
t
with κ1 ≡ 1 − (I/K),κ 2 =( I/K)(1 + β)τ2Ψ. Capital services used in pro-
duction are deﬁned as: ￿ kt = ￿ vt + ￿ ¯ kt−1
• Optimal capital utilisation condition:
￿ vt = ((1 − ψ)/ψ)￿ r
k
t
with ψ is the elasticity of the capital utilization cost function.
• Optimal input choice
￿ kt = ￿ ωt − ￿ r
k
t + ￿ nt
• Monetary policy rule:
￿ rt = ρr￿ rt−1 + (1 − ρr)(rπ￿ π
p
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n
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p




with ygapt ≡ ￿ yt − ￿ y
flex
t , is the diﬀerence between actual output and the
output in the ﬂexible price and wage economy in absence of distorting price
and wage markup shocks.
The following parameters are not identiﬁed by the estimation procedure
and are therefore calibrated: δ =0 .025,ς p = 10.The remaining parameters
τwE and a_g in Table 1 denote, respectively, the trend growth rate in real
"average weekly earnings" which is allowed to diﬀer from the common trend,
and the spillover eﬀect of neutral-technology shocks on the exogenous demand
shock in the speciﬁcation that relaxes the independence assumption.
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Table 1: Posterior Estimates for the model with and without unemployment as
observed variable - Complete list of parameters
prior distribution posterior distribution
With UR Without-UR
type mean st.dev mode mean 5% 95% mode mean 5% 95%
st.dev. of the innovations
1
σa U 2.5 1.44 0.41 0.42 0.37 0.46 0.42 0.42 0.37 0.46
σb U 2.5 1.44 1.73 1.60 0.56 2.50 0.73 0.91 0.35 1.66
σg U 2.5 1.44 0.47 0.48 0.43 0.52 0.47 0.48 0.43 0.52
σq U 2.5 1.44 0.42 0.42 0.34 0.49 0.38 0.38 0.30 0.46
σr U 2.5 1.44 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.26
σp U 2.5 1.44 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.18 0.06 0.32 0.02 0.73
σw U 2.5 1.44 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.13 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.20
σls U 2.5 1.44 1.07 1.17 0.89 1.45 - - --
σwC U 2.5 1.44 0.45 0.46 0.41 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.40 0.50
σwE U 2.5 1.44 0.34 0.36 0.32 0.41 0.33 0.34 0.29 0.39
persistence of the exogenous processes: ρ = AR(1), µ = MA(1)
ρa B 0.5 0.2 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.99
ρb B 0.5 0.2 0.36 0.42 0.19 0.67 0.66 0.64 0.39 0.86
ρg B 0.5 0.2 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.99
ρq B 0.5 0.2 0.72 0.75 0.62 0.88 0.75 0.74 0.62 0.86
ρr B 0.5 0.2 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.17 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.19
ρp B 0.5 0.2 0.76 0.43 0.07 0.79 0.84 0.64 0.23 0.93
ρw B 0.5 0.2 0.99 0.98 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00
µp B 0.5 0.2 0.59 0.57 0.24 0.96 0.68 0.73 0.46 0.97
µw B 0.5 0.2 0.67 0.63 0.35 0.91 0.66 0.65 0.38 0.91
a_g
2 N 0.5 0.25 0.69 0.69 0.55 0.83 0.71 0.70 0.56 0.85
structural parameters
Ψ N 4.0 1.0 4.09 3.96 2.34 5.58 3.33 3.77 2.32 5.20
h B 0.7 0.10 0.78 0.75 0.65 0.85 0.66 0.68 0.57 0.81
ϕ N 2.0 1.0 3.99 4.35 3.37 5.32 3.32 3.46 2.27 4.66
υ B 0.5 0.2 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.73 0.70 0.50 0.92
θp B 0.5 0.15 0.58 0.62 0.53 0.71 0.60 0.71 0.56 0.84
θw B 0.5 0.15 0.47 0.55 0.44 0.66 0.61 0.66 0.56 0.76
γp B 0.5 0.15 0.26 0.49 0.20 0.78 0.26 0.46 0.16 0.82
γw B 0.5 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.07 0.29 0.17 0.20 0.08 0.31
ψ B 0.5 0.15 0.57 0.56 0.36 0.75 0.41 0.42 0.24 0.60
Mp N 1.25 0.12 1.74 1.74 1.61 1.88 1.71 1.73 1.59 1.86
ρR B 0.75 0.10 0.85 0.86 0.82 0.89 0.83 0.84 0.79 0.89
rπ N 1.5 0.25 1.91 1.89 1.62 2.16 2.03 1.96 1.65 2.26
ry N 0.12 0.05 0.15 0.16 0.11 0.22 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.10
r∆y N 0.12 0.05 0.24 0.25 0.20 0.30 0.27 0.28 0.22 0.33
π G 0.62 0.1 0.62 0.66 0.49 0.83 0.79 0.80 0.61 0.99
100(β
−1 − 1) G 0.25 0.1 0.31 0.31 0.17 0.43 0.21 0.22 0.11 0.33
l N 0.0 2.0 -1.65 -1.52 -3.83 0.77 3.56 3.37 1.46 5.29
τ N 0.4 0.1 0.34 0.34 0.30 0.37 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.43
τwE N 0.2 0.1 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.15
Mw N 1.25 0.25 1.18 1.22 1.15 1.29 1.25
3 1.25
3 --
α N 0.3 0.05 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.19
1 The IG-distribution is deﬁned by the degree of freedom. 2 The eﬀect of TFP innovations on
exogenous demand. 3 The steady state wage mark-up is not identiﬁed if the unemployment rate
is not observed.Appendix
WORKING PAPER No. 106 35
Table 2: Variance Decomposition
Variance Decomposition output inﬂation real wage employment labor force unemployment
10 quarter horizon
Demand Shocks
R i s kp r e m i u m 6/1 4 2/8 3/6 1 6/ 2 5 0/1 5 2 0/2 5
E x o g e n o u sd e m a n d 3/5 1/0 1/0 7/1 0 1/9 8/1
I n v e s t m e n ts p e c .t e c h n . 9/7 3/2 8/2 1 2/9 2/3 1 0/2
M o n e t a r yp o l i c y 5/7 8/8 6/4 1 1/1 2 0/4 1 1/1 0
Supply Shocks
P r o d u c t i v i t y 5 9/4 6 6/4 4 0/ 3 2 5/2 3/4 4/1
P r i c em a r k - u p 2/6 2 7/3 3 3 0/4 5 3/6 5/3 0/1
Labor Market shocks
Wage mark-up 6 / 15 53 / 46 12 / 11 18 / 35 3 / 61 41 / 61
L a b o rs u p p l y 1 1/- 0/- 1/- 2 9/- 8 6/- 5/-
40 quarter horizon
Demand Shocks
R i s kp r e m i u m 2/5 1/6 1/3 6/8 0/6 7/7
E x o g e n o u sd e m a n d 1/2 1/0 1/0 3/5 1/8 3/0
I n v e s t m e n ts p e c .t e c h n . 5/3 2/1 6/3 4/3 1/2 3/0
M o n e t a r yp o l i c y 2/3 5/7 3/3 4/4 0/2 4/3
Supply Shocks
P r o d u c t i v i t y 5 6/3 9 4/3 7 1/5 9 3/1 2/1 1/0
P r i c em a r k - u p 1/2 1 8/2 6 1 3/2 6 1/2 2/1 0/0
Labor Market shocks
Wage mark-up 17 / 45 67 / 57 5 / 6 39 / 77 5 / 81 80 / 89
L a b o rs u p p l y 1 7/- 0/- 0/- 4 0/- 8 9/- 2/-
Note: each cell reports the contributions to the forecast error variance
of the corresponding variable for the models estimated with and without
unemployment, respectively.Appendix
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Figure 2. Two Wage Inflation Measures
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Figure 7.  Two Measures of the Output Gap
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Figure 8.  The Output Gap and the Unemployment Rate  
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Figure 9.  The Output Gap vs. Detrended GDP  

















Figure 10.  The Natural  Rate of Unemployment
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Figure 11.  Sources of Unemployment Rate Fluctuations








  historical UR
supply shocks
demand shocks







  historical UR
labor supply
wage mark-up
Figure 12.  Unemployment during the Great RecessionAppendix
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Figure 13.  Unemployment and Wage Inflation







Conditional Phillips Curves: price inflation
 
 






































































productivity price markup risk premium
exogenous spending investment monetary policy
labor supply wage markup actual data
Figure 14.  Unemployment and Price Inflation







Conditional Phillips Curves: wage inflation
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